If I’m wrong about this, sorry, but I’ll be too blown up to care.
Salad
This week, experts from the US and Russia sat down on a Stimson Center Zoom call to discuss the expiration of New START, aka СНВ-III.
Speaking were: Rita Guenther, Scott Sagan, Anton Khlopkov, Feodor Voitolovsky, Matthew Bunn, and Dmitry Stefanovich.
Watch the recorded discussion here.
What is START and what is it not?
New START places limits on the number of weapons and delivery systems the US and Russia maintain. The limit is 700 deployed missiles and bombers, 1550 deployed warheads, and 800 nuclear-capable launchers. Read the treaty here, it’s very short.
New START is not an agreement not to use nuclear weapons on each other, and it is not about conventional (non-nuclear) weapons. It’s an agreement to plateau the number of nuclear weapons that exist and stop that number increasing.
Under the provisions of New START, the US and Russia were allowed to update and replace their nukes with better ones (Article V). Both countries agreed to share information on their arsenals and to have inspections (Article XI). They also agreed not to tamper with the information that was shared (Article X). Again, New START was supposed to freeze the arms race, but the threat of nuclear annihilation has always remained.
Main
There was almost unanimous agreement amongst the speakers on matters of nuclear security and proliferation. Both sides lamented the lapse of New START, noting that not having such treaties, their information sharing, and mutual inspections, makes both Russia and the United States less safe. The speakers were adamant on keeping the ban on interfering with national technical means of verification (see also Wikipedia for an explainer). Without that ban on interference, it becomes increasingly difficult to monitor the number of strategic forces on each side, which could lead to misunderstandings and accidents with unimaginable consequences. Everyone wanted voluntary information sharing and voluntary inspections. However, Putin and Trump likely DGAF.
Many on the Russian side stressed that Russia does not want any more proliferation, either in friendly or unfriendly states. With the US’ retreat from Europe and the potential closing of the nuclear umbrella, there is a fear that Britain and France will increase their nuclear capabilities. Nations like Germany or Poland may also become nuclear states. Russia doesn’t want this, and neither should the US: More nuclear states means greater complexity and more chances for disaster to strike. The group briefly discussed China, a destabilizer in the US-Russia nuclear equation. The speakers noted that the PRC is in no way interested in limiting their nuclear weapons development, which makes many in Washington (and likely Moscow) uneasy.
In all of these cases, the speakers expressed doubt that a multilateral nuclear controls deal between the US, Russia, and China would be possible. Russia and China would want the UK and France to be covered by the treaty, and then each country would have such different goals that it would be near-impossible to satisfy them all enough for them to sign on. Bilateral agreements have so far been easier to manage.
Although Russia was the first to stop observing New START when Russia stopped providing information to the US on its arsenal, Putin did offer to extend New START by a year. Why has Trump not agreed? Scott Sagan from Stanford’s CISAC ripped the President a new one while listing out potential reasons: Some in the Trump administration want to increase the US nuclear arsenal to deter China, as well as Russia. The second reason is that the White House is so busy that nukes are not a current priority. Third, Trump’s own mentality that ‘he can get a better deal’, may be getting in the way. Matthew Bunn added to this, noting that Trump may be trying to wait the Russians out to see if they give him that better deal.
Dessert
“You can address tech with counter-tech, but this is a path to nowhere.” If you’re interested in the technical side of things from Moscow’s perspective, Dmitry Stefanovich is one to watch. He’s gives off the cynical air of a teenage hacker from a ‘90s movie. He’s cool. Particularly those concerned with Russia’s new slew of weapons such as the Burevestnik, Poseidon, or Oreshnik, he’s the one to follow. This is his substack.
Finally, look out for the NPT Conference this April and May. The experts noted that nothing had been agreed upon in the most recent NPT conferences, but there is a sense of optimism that New START’s expiration may lead to some developments this year.
Extra finally was Rita Guenther’s closing appeal. In the period of no information sharing between the US and Russian Federation, much of the expertise in inspecting and monitoring nuclear arsenals risks being lost. Guenther encouraged the wider technical community to preserve this knowledge and cultivate that expertise despite the current upheaval.
Now I’m off to bed. Hope I don’t wake up as radioactive ash!